Healthcare IoT
Connected Medical Devices Raise New Security Questions
Published by IOT New Jersey Research & Editorial Team

- Why Medical Devices Are Different From Ordinary IT
- What the Rules and Expectations Say
- Why This Matters Locally
- A Practical Security Program in Six Steps
- What to Ask Before You Buy
- A Composite Example: Finding the Devices Nobody Listed
- When Something Goes Wrong: Incident Response for Devices
- Home Devices Extend the Problem
- Facility Systems Belong in the Same Conversation
- Metrics Leaders Can Track
- Culture and Training
- Mistakes to Avoid
A hospital's network used to mean computers, servers, and printers. Today it also includes infusion pumps, patient monitors, imaging systems, ventilators, connected beds, refrigerators that hold vaccines, and a growing number of devices that patients take home. Each of these is a computer with a medical purpose, and each can be a way in for an attacker, a source of disruption, or a quiet gap in the record of who has access to what. For New Jersey providers, from large systems to small independent practices, connected medical device security has moved from an IT footnote to a patient safety question. This article explains why these devices are hard to secure, what rules and expectations now apply, and what a practical program looks like. It sits alongside the broader growth of connected care in New Jersey.
Why Medical Devices Are Different From Ordinary IT
Several features make connected devices a tougher security problem than a laptop or a server.
- Long lifespans. A patient monitor or imaging system may stay in service for a decade or more, long after its operating system stops receiving updates.
- Limited patching. Updates may need the manufacturer's approval, a service visit, or downtime that a busy unit cannot spare.
- Safety constraints. A security fix that disrupts how a device performs can be unacceptable when a patient depends on it.
- Poor visibility. Many devices cannot run security software, and staff may not know what is connected, where it is, or what software it runs.
- Vendor dependence. Remote support connections let manufacturers help, and they also create paths into the hospital that someone has to supervise.
What the Rules and Expectations Say
Responsibility is shared between manufacturers and the providers who use their products, and both sides now face clearer expectations.
Manufacturers Under Federal Device Law
Congress added Section 524B to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in December 2022. It requires makers of certain connected devices, called cyber devices, to include cybersecurity information in premarket submissions, to maintain processes for monitoring and addressing vulnerabilities after sale, and to provide a software bill of materials, which lists the software components inside a product. The FDA published updated final guidance in June 2025 on cybersecurity in medical devices that explains how it expects manufacturers to meet these requirements. The agency reads the cyber device definition broadly, so a product need not be continuously networked to be covered.
Providers Under HIPAA
Providers that handle patient data must safeguard it under the HIPAA Security Rule. The federal government proposed a major update in January 2025, which would add more prescriptive requirements such as encryption, multifactor authentication, network segmentation, and regular testing. The proposal drew heavy comment from hospitals and health systems, and as of July 2026 reporting on the federal regulatory agenda, final action had slipped to July 2027. Providers should not wait for a final rule to act, since existing requirements already call for risk analysis and reasonable safeguards, and since the direction of travel is clear.
Why This Matters Locally
New Jersey healthcare is dense, interconnected, and consolidated. Patients move between systems, practices share vendors, and a single outside service provider can affect many organizations at once. The state's providers have seen the consequences of cyber incidents firsthand. Cooper University Health Care, for example, disclosed that a 2024 network incident potentially exposed information on roughly 60,000 current and former patients. That event was a network intrusion, not a device flaw, but it shows what is at stake when attackers reach clinical environments, and connected devices expand the number of places where that can happen.
A Practical Security Program in Six Steps
- Build an inventory. List every connected device: type, location, software version, network address, owner, and manufacturer contact. Passive network monitoring can discover devices that were never recorded.
- Rank by risk. Devices that touch patients directly, run old software, or connect to many systems come first.
- Segment the network. Place medical devices on separate network segments, with rules that allow only the traffic they need, so a compromise in one area does not spread.
- Control vendor access. Require remote support through monitored, time-limited sessions, with named accounts and logs.
- Plan for patching and end of life. Agree with manufacturers on update schedules, track which devices are no longer supported, and add compensating controls such as stricter segmentation for those that cannot be updated.
- Prepare for downtime. Write and rehearse procedures for operating when devices or networks are unavailable, since safety depends on care continuing during an incident.
What to Ask Before You Buy
| Question | What a Good Answer Looks Like |
|---|---|
| Can you provide a software bill of materials? | Yes, in a standard format, with a process to update it as the product changes |
| How do you handle newly found vulnerabilities? | A published process, defined timelines, and a contact for coordinated reporting |
| How long will you support this product with security updates? | A clear date, in writing, that matches the device's expected service life |
| How is remote access handled? | Provider-controlled, time-limited, logged, and with multifactor authentication |
| Can you complete our security questionnaire? | Yes, including the industry's standard manufacturer disclosure form for device security |
| What happens to patient data if we end the contract? | Defined return and deletion terms |
A Composite Example: Finding the Devices Nobody Listed
Consider a mid-sized community hospital that decides to inventory its connected devices before a planned network upgrade. The biomedical team has a list of about a thousand assets. A passive network scan shows several hundred more connected endpoints, including older bedside monitors on an unused wing, a vendor-supplied imaging workstation that runs an unsupported operating system, and a handful of printers and cameras on the same network as clinical systems. None of this is unusual. The value of the exercise is that decisions can now be made against real data: which devices to isolate, which to replace, and which vendors to call first. This scenario is illustrative, not a report on any particular hospital, but the pattern of a real inventory being larger than the paper one is widely reported.
When Something Goes Wrong: Incident Response for Devices
Incident plans written for office computers often fail in clinical settings, because the first instinct, taking a system offline, may be unsafe. A device incident plan should say who decides whether a device can be disconnected, what the clinical fallback is, who contacts the manufacturer, and how patient safety is weighed against containment. It should name the clinical engineering lead, an IT security lead, and a senior clinician as decision makers, and it should be rehearsed at least once a year with a realistic scenario. After an incident, record what was learned and update the inventory and segmentation rules. Reporting duties may apply under HIPAA and other rules, so include legal counsel and the privacy officer in the plan from the start.
Home Devices Extend the Problem
When a practice sends a patient home with a connected cuff or scale, the device becomes part of the provider's risk, even though it sits in a living room. Practices running remote monitoring, as described in remote patient monitoring for New Jersey independent practices, should confirm how data is encrypted in transit, how the platform authenticates devices, who can see readings, and how a lost or stolen device is handled. Small practices often rely on vendors for most of this, which makes the vendor selection questions above even more important.
Facility Systems Belong in the Same Conversation
Healthcare buildings run on connected systems that are not medical devices but can still affect patients: HVAC controls, medication refrigerator monitors, access control, and building automation. A compromised controller that drives operating room ventilation or storage temperature is a clinical risk. Facility and clinical engineering teams should share an inventory and network design, drawing on practices described in smart building strategies for New Jersey commercial real estate and on the evolving connectivity and security rules covered in our IoT news.
Metrics Leaders Can Track
- Percentage of connected devices in the inventory with a named owner and a known software version.
- Number of devices running unsupported software, and the plan for each.
- Share of devices placed on segmented networks.
- Time from vendor vulnerability notice to a risk decision.
- Number of vendor remote sessions, and the share that were approved, time-limited, and logged.
Reporting these figures to hospital leadership turns an abstract technical risk into a management matter with owners and deadlines.
Culture and Training
Technology controls fail without habits to support them. Clinical staff need simple guidance on what to do when a device behaves oddly, how to report it, and why they should never connect an unapproved device to the network. Biomedical engineers and IT staff often work in separate organizations with different priorities, and a joint committee that meets regularly, with authority to make decisions, closes the gap more effectively than a policy document. Include clinicians in decisions about downtime procedures, because they know what care cannot pause.
Mistakes to Avoid
The most common is treating the problem as purely technical and assigning it only to IT. The second is relying on a one-time inventory that goes stale in months. The third is accepting a vendor's assurance without a written commitment. The fourth is putting off segmentation because it feels disruptive, when the cost of a flat network is far higher in an incident. Start small: inventory one department, segment it, test the downtime plan, and use the results to build support for the rest of the organization.
